This paper analyses the e¤ects of money shocks on macroeconomic aggregates in a ‡exible-price, incomplete-markets environment that generates persistent wealth inequalities amongst agents. In this framework, unexpected money shocks redistribute wealth from the cash-rich employed to the cash-poor unemployed, and induce the former to increase their labour supply in order to maintain their desired levels of consumption and precautionary savings. The reduced-form dynamics of the model is a textbook 'output-in ‡ation tradeo¤'equation whereby in ‡ation shocks raise current output. The attenuating role of mean in ‡ation and money growth persistence on this non-neutrality tradeo¤, as well as some of the welfare implications of wealth redistribution, are also examined.
Introduction
This paper analyses the e¤ects of money shocks on macroeconomic variables within a ‡exible-price, incomplete-markets environment that generates persistent wealth inequalities amongst agents. More speci…cally, we explore the aggregate and welfare e¤ects of unexpected monetary injections in a Bewley-type model where money serves as a short-run store of value allowing agents to self-insure against idiosyncratic income ‡uctuations. As was …rst shown by Bewley (1980 Bewley ( , 1983 , and further analysed in a number of contributions including Kehoe et al. (1992) , Imrohoroglu (1992) , and Akyol (2004) , this role for money arises naturally in environments where insurance markets are missing and agents cannot borrow against future income. We draw on this literature by emphasising the role of money as a bu¤er stock against labour-income ‡uctuations, where money partly substitutes for the lack of insurance and credit markets. Unlike the existing literature, however, we analyse the short-run impact of in ‡ation shocks on output, rather than focusing on the long-run e¤ect of steady-state in ‡ation.
A distinguishing feature of Bewley models (relative to complete markets models) is that cash holdings are heterogenous across agents in equilibrium, because the money wealth accumulated by every single agent depends on the sequence of idiosyncratic shocks that each agent has faced. With such unequal cash holdings, lump-sum money injections that raise the price level lower the value of previously-accumulated balances and redistribute money wealth from relatively cash-rich agents, who pay the in ‡ation tax, towards poorer agents, who bene…t from the corresponding in ‡ation subsidy. Without aggregate shocks, the redistributive e¤ect of (fully anticipated) in ‡ation can help households to self-insure against idiosyncratic shocks and thereby justi…es mean in ‡ation rates strictly higher than those prescribed by the so-called 'Friedman rule'(e.g., Kehoe et al, 1992; Akyol, 2004) . 1 In the present paper, we explore the aggregate implications of unexpected, but possibly persistent, monetary injections. Thus, our paper explores the non-neutrality of money implied by wealth redistribution within a framework combining both idiosyncratic and aggregate uncertainty about agents'incomes.
1 The Friedman rule states that the in ‡ation rate should be set so as to bring the nominal interest rate on bonds down to zero (Friedman, 1969) . It has been shown to hold in a variety of monetary models with representative agents (see Woodford, 1990 , for a survey).
In our model, idiosyncratic income risk is rooted in the transitions of individual households between 'employment', a status where they can freely choose the labour supply they rent out to competitive …rms, and 'unemployment', where households receive a …xed subsidy lower than equilibrium wage income. One central implication of our analysis is that aggregate monetary shocks generate a traditional 'output-in ‡ation tradeo¤', whereby in ‡ation shocks contemporaneously raise employed households'labour supply and thus output. In our economy, the in ‡ation tax redistributes real wealth from the employed, who are unconstrained and hold positive cash holdings at the beginning of the period, towards the unemployed, who are borrowing-constrained at the start of the period and thus initially hold no cash.
This redistribution from unconstrained to constrained households forces the former to increase their labour supply to replete their money wealth and maintain their desired levels of consumption and money holdings. The implied increase in hours then raises current output, generating an output-in ‡ation tradeo¤ whose underlying mechanism di¤ers from traditional ones such as those based on sticky prices (e.g., Ball et al., 1988) or imperfect information (see Lucas, 1973) .
What does the size of this monetary non-neutrality depend on? In our model, the redistributive e¤ect of an in ‡ation shock is positively related to the gap between the real balances of cash-rich and cash-poor agents, i.e., the degree of inequality in the distribution of money holdings. Higher in ‡ation, inasmuch as it reduces the attractiveness of real balances as a means of self insurance, deters employed households from accumulating these balances and thus diminishes both money wealth inequalities and the implied impact of in ‡ation shocks.
Highly-persistent money growth shocks, to the extent that they forecast greater in ‡ation taxes on future real balances, transitorily lower real money demand and induce a negative e¤ect of money growth shocks on labour supply and output. The output e¤ects of monetary shocks are thus larger when both the mean and the persistence of money growth are low. In the extreme opposite situation where both are very large, the intertemporal e¤ects on future in ‡ation taxes may even dominate the intratemporal, redistributive e¤ect of the current in ‡ation tax, and lead to a reversal in the sign of the tradeo¤.
Our analysis follows the route opened by Bewley (1980) , Scheinkman and Weiss (1986) and Kehoe et al. (1992) . Bewley and Kehoe et al. focused on the optimal long-run in ‡ation rate and did not analyse the short-run non-neutrality of money under incomplete markets.
Scheinkman and Weiss were the …rst to identify the non-neutrality of money shocks when borrowing constraints make cash holdings heterogenous; however, the in…nite-dimensional wealth distribution of their model did not allow them to derive the output-in ‡ation tradeo¤, let alone relate its size to the underlying deep parameters of the model such as mean in ‡ation, money growth persistence, or the number of borrowing-constrained agents in the economy.
Given the lack of tractability of heterogenous-agent models with in…nite-state wealth distributions, an alternative approach to the one we follow is to solve them computationally.
However, computational limitations have thus far limited the applicability of these models to the study of optimal steady-state in ‡ation, again leaving aside the analysis of the short-run e¤ects of in ‡ation shocks (e.g., Imrohoroglu, 1992, and Akyol, 2004) . We circumvent this di¢ culty by deriving a closed-form solution to our incomplete-markets model that generates a …nite-state wealth distribution and a …nite number of agent types.
Finally, the non-neutrality of in ‡ation shocks working through wealth redistribution has recently been explored in frameworks di¤erent from Bewley models but which also generate heterogenous wealth levels across agents in equilibrium. Within the overlapping generations tradition, Doepke and Schneider (2006) look at the aggregate e¤ects of inter-cohort redistribution from old retirees to young workers, and …nd a negative e¤ect of in ‡ation shocks on output in the short and medium run; in contrast, our model can generate a positive short-run relation between in ‡ation and output due to intra-cohort wealth redistribution. Berentsen et al. (2005) study the e¤ects of non-persistent money supply shocks in a search-theoretic monetary model; besides being based on a very di¤erent set of assumptions, our framework can handle auto-correlated shocks and thus assess the joint e¤ects of current and expected in ‡ation taxes on aggregate outcomes.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and spells out its optimality and market-clearing conditions. Section 3 derives a closed-form equilibrium with two possible levels of real money holdings and four types of agents. Section 4 analyses the properties of the short-run output-in ‡ation tradeo¤ generated by the model, paying particular attention to the role of mean in ‡ation and the persistence of shocks in a¤ecting the slope of the tradeo¤. Section 5 concludes.
The model
The economy is populated by a large number of …rms, as well as a unit mass of in…nitely-lived households i 2 [0; 1], all interacting in perfectly-competitive labour and goods markets.
Firms produce output, y t , from labour input, l t , using the CRS technology y t = l t ; they thus adjust labour demand up to the point where the real wage is equal to 1. Households' behaviour, on the other hand is potentially a¤ected by both the (uninsurable) idiosyncratic income uncertainty that they face and the aggregate shock.
Uncertainty
Individual states. In every period, each household can be either employed or unemployed.
We denote by 2 ; being the probabilities of staying employed and unemployed, respectively. Given this Markov chain for individual states, the asymptotic unemployment rate is:
The history of individual shocks up to date t is denoted e Aggregate states. Money growth shocks are the only source of economy-wide uncertainty that we consider. The history of these shocks up to date t is denoted h t , while H t is the set of all possible histories for these shocks up to date t. Let denote the probability measure over histories up to date t: t : H t ! [0; 1]; t = 0; 1; ::: As before, t (h t ) denotes the probability of history h t and h t+1 h t indicates that h t+1 is a possible continuation of h t .
In every period, a real amount t (h t ) > 0 of newly-issued …at money is given symmetrically to all households by the monetary authorities (we show below how the latter is related to money growth, t (h t )). 2 Moreover, in equilibrium the price level and the in ‡a-tion rate are functions of the history of aggregate states. These are denoted P t (h t ) and
Households'behaviour
The household's instantaneous utility function is u (c) l, where c is consumption, l is labour supply, > 0 a scale parameter, and where u is a C 2 function satisfying u 0 (c) > 0, u 00 (c) < 0 and (c) cu 00 (c) =u 0 (c) 1 8c 0 (i.e. consumption and leisure are not gross complements). Fiat money is the only outside asset available and, since private borrowing is prohibited, the only asset that households can use to smooth consumption. Employed households (i.e. those for whom
2 Our assumption that tranfers are symmetric and lump sum follows much of the litereature on Bewley models (e.g., Scheinkman and Weiss, 1986; Kehoe et al., 1992; Imrohoroglu, 1992) . It can be justi…ed on the grounds that monetary authorities are not su¢ ciently well informed to treat individual agents di¤erently, as is discussed in Kehoe et al. (1992) and Levine (1991) .
3 Alternatively, can be interpreted as an unemployment subsidy …nanced through a compulsory lumpsum contribution, e = U = (1 U ), paid by all employed households and ensuring the equilibrium of the unemployment insurance scheme in the steady state. In this case, steady-state labour supply and output are higher than under the home production interpretation (as working households attempt to o¤set the wealth e¤ect of the unemployment contribution), but the dynamic behaviour of the economy faced with aggregate uncertainty is unchanged.
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where 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, subject to
Equation (2) is the nominal budget constraint of household i at date t, while the last inequality in (3) indicates that agents cannot have negative asset holdings. The Lagrangian function associated with household i's problem, formulated in real terms, is:
Equation (4) de…nes household i's marginal utility, while (5) and (6) are the intratemporal and intertemporal optimality conditions, respectively. Equation (7) states that either the borrowing constraint is binding for household i (' that will always hold along the equilibria that we will consider. Note that (6) can be written more compactly as:
Market clearing
Goods market. Equilibrium in the market for goods requires that, at each date and for all histories of aggregate states h t 2 H t ; the sum of each type of agent's consumption be equal to total production. Given the assumed production function, total production is simply the sum of individual labour supplies and home production, so that we have:
where the summation operator R is over individual households.
Money market. Let M t (h t ) denote the nominal quantity of money at date t; then moneymarket clearing may equally be written as:
Denote real money supply by m t (h t ) M t (h t ) =P t (h t ) and the (gross) rate of money
. Then, symmetric real money injections can be written as:
while the law of motion for the real quantity of money is:
An equilibrium is de…ned as sequences of individual consumption levels, fc 3 Equilibria with two-state wealth distributions
In general, heterogenous-agent models such as that described above generate an in…nite-state distribution of agent types, as all individual characteristics (i.e., agents'wealth and implied optimal choices) depend on the personal history of each agent. In this paper, we derive a closed-form solution of the model with a …nite number of household types by considering a class of equilibria where the cross-sectional distribution of money holdings is two-state.
The derivation involves three steps. First, we conjecture the general shape of the solution; second, we identify the conditions under which the hypothesised solution results; and third, we set the relevant parameters (the productivity of home production, here) in such a way that these conditions are always ful…lled along the equilibrium under consideration.
Conjectured equilibrium
We conjecture the existence of an equilibrium along which
that is, one where no employed household is borrowing-constrained (so that they all store cash to smooth consumption), while all unemployed households are borrowing-constrained (and thus hold no cash). From here on, we simplify notation by simply using the i-index for variables that depend on individual histories and the t-index for those that depend on the aggregate history.
Consider …rst the consumption level of an unemployed household. If this household was employed in the previous period, then from (2) and (12) their current consumption is:
On the other hand, from (2) the consumption level of unemployed households who were already unemployed in the previous period is identical across such households and given by:
We now turn to employed households. From (4) and (5), their consumption level is identical across employed households and independent of aggregate history, i.e.,
From equations (9) and (12), the intertemporal optimality condition for an employed household is = E t i t+1 = (1 + t+1 ) . If this household is employed in the following period, which occurs with probability , then i t+1 = (see (5) 
which in turns implies that all employed households wish to hold the same quantity of real balances, denoted by m e t (i.e., 8i 2 [0; 1],
. We may thus rewrite equation (13), giving the consumption level of unemployed households which were previously employed, as follows:
The labour supplies of employed households depend on whether they were employed or not in the previous period. Using Eqs. (2) and (15) these are given by, respectively,
In other words, when all unemployed households are borrowing-constrained and no employed household is, households can be of four di¤erent types, depending only on their current and past employment status, with their personal history before t 1 being irrelevant. This distributional simpli…cation is essentially the outcome of the joint assumption that all unemployed households liquidate their asset holdings (i.e., . We denote these four households types ee, eu, ue and uu, where the …rst and second letters refer to date t 1 and date t employment states, respectively. Since our focus is on the way in which idiosyncratic unemployment risk a¤ects self-insurance by the employed, we consider the e¤ect of variations in taking U in (1) as given (the implied probability of leaving unemployment is thus = 1 (1 ) (1 U ) =U ).
We then write the asymptotic shares of households as:
and we abstract from transitional issues regarding the distribution of household types by assuming that the economy starts at this invariant distribution.
Given the consumption and labour supply levels of each type of household, goods-market clearing now implies that:
In the equilibrium under consideration, which we assume to prevail from date 0 onwards, unemployed households hold no money while all employed households hold the real quantity m e t . Money-market clearing thus requires that
Existence conditions
The condition for the distribution just derived to be an equilibrium is that the borrowing constraint never be binding for ee and ue households but always be binding for both uu and eu households. The constraint is not binding for employed households if the latter never wish to borrow. Thus, interior solutions to (16) must always be such that:
On the other hand, the Lagrange multiplier ' i t must be positive when households are unemployed, so that from (4)-(6) we must have i t > E t i t+1 = (1 + t+1 ). First consider uu households, whose current consumption is just + t (see (14)), and thus for whom i t = u 0 ( + t ). These households remain unemployed with probability , in which case they will also consume + t in the following period and thus i t+1 = u 0 + t+1 : They leave unemployment with probability 1 and will then consume u 0 1 ( ) in the following period, so that
Thus, uu households are borrowing-constrained whenever:
We now turn to eu households. Their current consumption is given by Eq. (17), so that i t = u 0 m e t 1 = (1 + t ) + + t ; while, just like uu households, they will be either uu or ue households in the following period. Thus, eu households are borrowing-constrained whenever:
If (23) holds then (25) is more stringent than (24), so (25) is a su¢ cient condition for both uu and eu households to be borrowing-constrained. We show in the Appendix that when lies within the range ( ; + ), where 0 < + , then both (23) and (25) hold for all t 0, provided that aggregate shocks have su¢ ciently small support. Intuitively, for our equilibrium to exist home production must be su¢ ciently productive to deter unemployed households from saving, whilst at the same time being su¢ ciently unproductive to induce positive precautionary savings by employed households.
Intratemporal vs. intertemporal e¤ects of monetary shocks and in ‡ation taxes
We are now in a position to derive the solution dynamics of our equilibrium with limited wealth heterogeneity. Using (10), (11), (16) and (22), we can summarise the dynamic behaviour of the economy by a single forward-looking equation, namely,
Equation (26) . From now on, we take t as the exogenous state variables, with the transfer t being endogenously determined by Eq. (10) in equilibrium. Then, our assumption that t > 0 implies that t > 1 for all t, and we further assume that t has small bounded support [ ; + ], with > 1.
All equilibrium variables at date t can be expressed as functions of m e t and t only. For example, substituting (10)- (11) and (22) into (18)- (19), we derive the following expressions for the labour supplies of employed households, depending on their speci…c type: 
where l ee t ; l ue t > 0. Similarly, substituting (10)- (11) and (22) into (14) and (17), the consumption levels of unemployed households can be expressed as:
It is apparent from equations (27)-(28) that money growth shocks can a¤ect real variables either directly through changes in t (inside each bracketed term), or indirectly through their potential e¤ect on current real money demand, m e t (as determined by equation (26)). For reasons that will become clear shortly, we refer to the former and the latter as the 'intratemporal'and 'intertemporal'e¤ects of monetary shocks, respectively.
Intratemporal e¤ects
The intratemporal e¤ects of monetary shocks are isolated when money growth is i.i.d., in which case the current shock does not alter households'expectations about future in ‡ation taxes. With i.i.d. aggregate shocks, the …rst-order approximation to equation (26) (
where unindexed variables denote steady-state values (all of these are summarised in the Appendix). Two properties of m e are worth mentioning at this stage. First, m e falls with , as lower idiosyncratic unemployment risk reduces employed households' incentives to self-insure against this risk. Second, under our maintained assumption that (c) 1; m e falls with (this claim is established in the Appendix): as in ‡ation increases, the return to holding real balances decreases and money becomes less valuable as a self-insurance device against idiosyncratic unemployment shocks.
We can now turn to the e¤ects of i.i.d. aggregate shocks on labour supply and output.
Equations (11) and (29) imply that t = t 1. Thus, individual labour supplies are:
The latter equations summarise the redistributive e¤ects of the current in ‡ation tax on labour supplies. Note that l ee t rises while l ue t falls as t increases, following households' adjustments to the intratemporal wealth redistribution generated by in ‡ation. After an in ‡ation shock, the households who pay the in ‡ation tax in period t are those who hold money at the beginning of period t (ee and eu households), while the households who bene…t from the corresponding in ‡ation subsidy are those who do not hold money at the beginning of period t (ue and uu households). Consequently, ee households are hurt by the shock and increase their labour supply to maintain their desired levels of consumption and money wealth, while ue households can a¤ord to work less than they would have done had the shock not occurred. From equations (20) and (30), market output, ! ee l ee t + ! ue l ue t , is given by:
Market output increases with current in ‡ation (i.e. greater labour supply by ee households dominates the lower supply of ue households) provided that U + > 1, or, equivalently
from (1), that + > 1 (that is, the average persistence in employment status must be su¢ ciently high, as we discuss further below). For small shocks, equation (31) can be approximated by the following linear 'ouput-in ‡ation tradeo¤'relation:
where
This tradeo¤ equation is reminiscent of those derived by Lucas (1973) or Ball et al. (1988) ; the underlying mechanism that we emphasise here works very di¤erently, however.
In Lucas, agents raise production after an in ‡ationary money shock because they cannot fully disentangle changes in relative prices from variations in the general price level; in Ball et al., the output-in ‡ation tradeo¤ arises naturally from nominal rigidities. In contrast, our model features perfect information, fully- ‡exible prices, but heterogenous cash balances.
Consequently, lump-sum monetary injections redistribute wealth from cash-rich to cashpoor households, thereby inducing employed households to alter their labour supplies in order to o¤set the implied wealth e¤ects. Interestingly, the model predicts that higher trend in ‡ation lowers the impact of in ‡ation shocks on output (i.e., @ =@ < 0), because it lowers money holdings by employed households and thus mitigates the redistributive e¤ects of these shocks. We may thus conclude that this negative relation is perfectly compatible with price ‡exibility, contrary to the claim in Ball et al. (1988) that it supports the hypothesis of nominal rigidities.
We summarise the results obtained so far in the following proposition: . Given the unemployment rates at these dates, this unambiguously gives + > 1 at an annual frequency, and by implication at quarterly frequency. Finally, although we literally refered to U and as the unemployment rate and the probability of staying employed, respectively, in the context of our equilibrium these are also the share of borrowing-constrained households in the economy and the probability of becoming borrowing-constrained. The conventional estimate for the share of borrowingconstrained households in the U.S. population is 0:2 (e.g., Jappelli, 1990) . Although there is no available estimate for the probability of becoming borrowing constrained (conditional on not being so), the unconditional probability of being constrained is strongly negatively correlated with both income and wealth (see Jappelli, 1990, Figures I and II) . Thus, should be related to the conditional probability distribution of falls in income or wealth (1 is, strictly speaking, the probability that the income or wealth of an unconstrained household will fall so much in the next period that it will render this household constrained). Here again, a value of below 0:8 does not seem realistic at a quarterly frequency, suggesting that the condition U + > 1 also holds under this interpretation.
Intertemporal e¤ects
Central to the transmission of monetary shocks here is the rôle, and determinants, of the real money holdings held by the employed as a bu¤er against idiosyncratic unemployment risk.
Under i.i.d money growth shocks, these holdings are constant over time as they are immediately and entirely repleted by employed households (through variations in labour supply)
following a shock that redistributes current wealth. Obviously, this simple adjustment to exogenous disturbances is complicated if real money demand is itself a¤ected by the current shock, which is precisely what occurs when money growth shocks display persistence. To further examine the e¤ect of auto-correlated aggregate shocks, assume that money growth obeys the following AR(1) process:
where 2 (0; 1) and f t g 1 t=0 is a white-noise process with zero mean and small bounded support. Linearising (26) around the steady state, we obtain:
where the hatted values denote proportional deviations from steady state (e.g.,m e t = (m e t m e ) =m e ) and A and B are the following constants:
Then, iterating (35) forwards under the transversality condition (8), and using (34), gives:
where B = (1 A ) > 0. Equation (36) summarises the e¤ect of current money growth on current real balances working through changes in future money growth (both relative to the steady state). With autocorrelated shocks, a relatively high current in ‡ation tax on employed households forecasts high future in ‡ation taxes, thereby lowering the desirability of money as a means of self-insurance and reducing households'incentives to supply labour to acquire it. To see how such money demand adjustments alter the response of market output to monetary shocks, use equations (10), (22) and (18)- (19) again to write (31) in the following slightly more general form:
Persistent money growth shocks lower m e t (because of the future in ‡ation taxes on real money), but raise (U ( t 1) + 1 ) = t provided that U + > 1 (through contemporaneous wealth redistribution). In other words, the e¤ect of future, expected in ‡ation taxes on real money demand runs counter the e¤ect induced by intratemporal wealth redistribution.
Linearising equation (37) and using (36), we obtain the following results.
Proposition 2. Assume that money growth, t , follows an AR(1) process with autocorrelation parameter 2 (0; 1). Then, the higher is , the lower is the impact of monetary shocks on output, while a necessary and su¢ cient condition for these shocks to raise output is:
Whether the latter condition holds or not ultimately depends on the deep parameters that enter both sides of the inequality. When ! 0, the analysis of the previous Section applies and monetary shocks raise current output if and only if U + > 1. As rises, the intertemporal e¤ect becomes more important and reduces the impact of shocks, possibly (but not necessarily) leading to a reversal in the sign of the tradeo¤ for large values of .
Finally, it is straightfoward to show that su¢ ciently high values of mean in ‡ation always lead to the violation of this condition (and thus to a reversal in the tradeo¤ slope), as they tend to mitigate the current in ‡ation tax (relative to future in ‡ation taxes) following a persistent monetary shock. Figure 1 illustrates the dynamic e¤ects of a persistent money growth shock on monetary and aggregate supply variables (…rst and second row, respectively). We set = 0:99, = 0:6, and = 1:005 (the time period is to be interpreted as a quarter). We interpret U as the share of borrowing-constrained households in the economy and set it to 0.2 (see the discussion in the previous Section). The probability of becoming borrowing constrained in the next quarter is set to 5%, so that = 0:95. The instantaneous utility function is ln c l and the home production parameter = 0:9c eu (these parameters ensure that the existence conditions stated in Section 3.2 are satis…ed.)
Following a persistent money growth shock, real money demand falls (due to the future in ‡ation taxes expected by employed households), and in ‡ation jumps up. ee-households persistently raise their labour supply to o¤set the in ‡ation tax, while ue-households lower their labour supply in response to the in ‡ation subsidy. Overall, the responses of labour supplies to the shock imply that the latter persistently raises output; this is because the labour supply response of ue households, although relatively large at the individual level, is actually small in the aggregate (with = 0:95, equation (20) 
Welfare considerations
Since the non-neutrality mechanism described in this paper relies on wealth redistribution (both at the time of the shock and in the future), it directly a¤ects the welfare of every single agent. Obviously, there are potential losers and winners resulting from wealth redistribution, meaning that we should not in general expect monetary shocks to unambiguously lead to better or worse dynamic equilibria in the Pareto sense.
To understand this point further, recall from (27)- (28) and (35) that all time-t variables can be expressed as functions of the only state variable of the model, current money growth t , and that t+1 only depends on t . We focus on the dynamic and welfare e¤ects of an once-o¤, unexpected aggregate shock, and call W i ( t ) the maximum value function of agent i when current money growth is t :
the …rst derivatives of this value function, evaluated at the steady state, and recall from (34) that @ t+1 =@ t = . Then, in the vicinity of the steady state (i.e., where
, and given the transition probabilities across employment status, the …rst derivatives of the Bellman equations associated with each agent type are related as follows:
The solution to this system expresses the …rst derivatives of the four value functions as (cumbersome) functions of the deep parameters of the model. 6 The e¤ects of money growth shocks on the intertemporal utility of individual households can easily be computed when ! 0 (the i.i.d. case in the limit). Then, the above system and equations (27)- (29) give:
These latter equations state that the households who bene…t from the in ‡ation subsidy at the time of the shock (uu and ue households, i.e., those who hold no cash at the beginning of the period) always see their utility increase, while those who pay for the in ‡ation tax (ee and eu households, who are cash-rich at the beginning of the period) necessarily experience a welfare loss. We cannot derive such clear-cut results on individuals' welfare, however, out of this limiting case, due to the combined e¤ect of future expected redistribution and the transition of households between employment states. For example, a households which currently su¤ers from the in ‡ation tax (say, a ee-household) may expect to bene…t from it in the future (if, for example, is low relative to ), making the overall welfare of this household a priori ambiguous. (Conversely, a household which currently bene…ts from the redistributive e¤ect of in ‡ation may su¤er from it in the future if the probability of being being cash-rich for su¢ ciently many periods in the future is high).
Concluding remarks
This paper has uncovered some dynamic and welfare e¤ects of aggregate monetary shocks in a Bewley-type monetary model with idiosyncratic labour income risk. We have shown that money-growth shocks that contemporary redistribute real money wealth across agents tend to raise output, unless this direct e¤ect is counterbalanced by the (indirect) e¤ect of expected future redistribution on the real demand for cash. Finally, the fact that wealth is redistributed both at the time of the shock and in the future (provided that money growth variations are persistent), combined with the perpetual transitions of households across employment status and cash-holding levels, implies that the welfare e¤ects of monetary shocks are in general ambiguous (in the Pareto sense).
The inherent complexity of Bewley-type models with both indiosyncratic and aggregate uncertainty, which is a consequence of the very large number of agent types that these models usually generate, is notorious and may have hindered their use (see the discussion in Kehoe and Levine, 2001) . Our response to this challenge has been to construct, and then to focus on, a closed-form equilibrium with a small number of wealth states and thus limited household heterogeneity. The resulting simplicity of our framework may make it useful for the better understanding of the e¤ects of other macroeconomic shocks (e.g., …scal policy shocks) in incomplete-market, heterogenous-agent economies. (1 + ) (1 ) :
Since we are considering ‡uctuations occurring arbitrarily close to the steady state, a su¢ cient condition for our closed-form solution to be an equilibrium is that both (23) and (25) hold with strict inequalities in the steady state. From (29), the …rst condition is simply:
(1 + ) (1 ) + :
In the steady state, the left-hand side of (25) is c eu . Using (A1), inequality (25) becomes:
(1 + ) (1 + ) (1 ) (1 ) > u 0 ( + ) :
In the steady state, = (1 U ) m e = (1 + ) (see Eqs. (10) and (22)). Substituting into (A2), using Eq. (29) and rearranging, we may rewrite the latter inequality as:
(1 + ) (1 + ) (1 )
The left-hand side of (A3) is positive at = 0 and thus for all > 0. The right-hand side of (A3) is decreasing and continuous in over [0; 1). Thus, if (A3) holds when evaluated at = + , then by continuity there exists < + such that (A3) holds for all > . Setting = + in (A3) and rearranging, we …nd:
(1 + ) (1 + ) (1 ) (1 ) 2 > 0;
which is always true when > 0 because the left-hand side increases with and is positive at = 0.
In Section 4.1 we referred to the comparative-static property that steady-state in ‡a-tion decreases with mean in ‡ation. To establish this, note that a su¢ cient condition for @m e =@ < 0 is that @ (1 + ) u 0 1 ((1 + ) = (1 ) ) @ (1 + ) < 0:
Since from A1 u 0 1 ((1 + ) = (1 ) ) = c eu , this condition may be written as:
or, after rearranging, (c eu ) < (1 + ) = (1 + ). This is always true since (c) 1 8c by assumption.
